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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
law. The court of appeals' opinion expressed some doubt concerning
the trial court's classification of the term "House of Beauty" as a
generic term descriptive of a kind of business. The opinion states
that: "Its meaning could be circumscribed by its adoption and exclu-
sive use as a trade name identifying a particular business enterprise,
thus becoming the property of the user as a trade name. ' 7 But there
was no serious evidence in the record that plaintiff had used the term
sufficiently to have acquired a secondary meaning.8
Prior Ohio authorities support this statement that descriptive
words, when identified with a particular business, are entitled to pro-
tection, whether they are fancifu 9 or in the common domain,10 when
used by a competitor in a manner so as to confuse the public, or when
proposed to be used with the probable result of confusion.
This litigation should be a reminder that the facts and circum-
stances of each unfair competition case are all important. It also
emphasizes the importance of the ability of the plaintiff to establish
by the weight of the evidence the existence of a secondary meaning
to his business name, and the evidence of actual damage arising from
the defendant's use of a confusing trade name, or the probability of
future damage flowing from its use.
MAURICE S. CULP
TRUSTS
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS - WHEN TRUST COMPANY
REQUIRED TO GIVE BOND
Winters National Bank & Trust Company v. Ross1 involves an
analysis by the Ohio Supreme Court of the various statutory provi-
sions concerning the posting of bond by trust companies when acting
as testamentary trustees. The court stated that unless dispensed with
by the will creating the trust, a trust company must give bond in the
amount set forth in Ohio Revised Code section 2109.04 before let-
ters of appointment may be issued to it as testamentary trustee. As
to any time after the issuance of lefters of appointment, however,
they held the requirement of bond from a trust company to be solely
within the discretion of the probate court.
7. Id. at 341.
8. For over a year prior to plaintiff's entry into business, there had been a beauty shop known
as "Mary Ellen's House of Beauty" operated in Parma. The opinion of the court of appeals
points out that there were at least ten other beauty shops in Greater Cleveland which used the
words "House of Beauty" as a part of their business names. Ibid.
9. Cloverleaf Restaurants Inc. v. Lenihan, 79 Ohio App. 493, 72 N.E.2d 761 (1946).
10. Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass'n, 22 Ohio App. 400, 154 NE. 352
(1926).
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BEQUEST TO CHARITABLE CORPORATION
The court of appeals in In re Bicknell's Estate2 held that a be-
quest to a Massachusetts college "in trust," the principal to be re-
tained forever and the income to be used as needed for furnishing and
decorating the college buildings, did not create a trust, but created a
gift to the college, subject to the enforceable obligation to use the
money for the purpose of the gift. Enforcement of the terms of the
gift was ruled to rest with the authorities of the state of Massachu-
setts, wherein the gift was to be administered. The reason assigned
by the court for the failure of the bequest as a trust was that there
was no separation of the legal and equitable interests in the property
involved, since the college was both sole trustee and sole beneficiary.
There is creditable authority for the court's position with respect to
the merger of the legal and equitable interests and the consequent
failure of the trust.3 However, it is urged that a better view is that
the persons or charitable corporations who benefit directly from such
trusts are not the sole beneficiaries thereof, but that society, or some
segment of society, also should be regarded as a beneficiary. In
other words, the immediate recipients of these trusts are merely the
conduits through which society receives the advantages of the trusts.
Even if this latter theory were adopted, the result of a gift rather
than a trust still could be attained, for the modern view is that a con-
veyance or bequest to a charitable corporation creates a gift, the
terms of which are enforceable, but does not create a trust.4
CHARITABLE TRUSTS - DOCTRINES OF CY PRES
AND DEVIATION
Testatrix, in Cheney v. State Council of Ohio Junior Order of
United 4merican Mechanics,5 bequeathed in one item of her will
... Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to the Epworth Methodist Church
of Marion, Ohio; the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to the
Marion Masonic Temple Company of Marion, Ohio, and Five Hundred
Dollars ($500.00) to the Junior Order of American Mechanics of
Marion, Ohio.
Testatrix' deceased husband had been a member of each of the three
organizations listed in her will. At the time of the testatrix' death,
the Junior Order of American Mechanics of Marion, Ohio no longer
existed. However, the State Council of Ohio Junior Order of United
American Mechanics was in existence, and claimed the bequest on
the ground that it is one and the same as the beneficiary named in
1. 169 Ohio St. 335, 159 N.E.2d 603 (1959). See also discussion in Wills and Decedents'
Estates section, p. 447 infsa.
2. 108 Ohio App. 51, 160 N.E.2d 550 (1958).
3. See St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939).
4. See RESTATEMENT, TRUsTs § 348 comment f (2d ed. 1959); ScoTT, TRusTs § 348.1
(2d ed. 1956).
5. 162 N.E.2d 242 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
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the above item of testatrix' will. Held: Neither the doctrine of cy
pres nor the doctrine of deviation applies, and the $500.00 in ques-
tion lapses and passes under the residuary clause of the textatrix' will.
The court ruled that "the absence of a general charitable intent pre-
cludes the application of the doctrine of cy pres."' They found that
the testatrix had no general charitable intent because the objects of
her bounty in the item involved were limited to religious and fra-
ternal orders in Marion, Ohio, of which her husband had been a
member, and because she manifested no intent to adopt the state or-
ganization, although it was in existence at the time of the execution
of her will. With respect to the doctrine of deviation, the court
stated that it had been limited to cases in which its application would
carry out the general purpose named by the settlor, and in which a
simple change incident to the method of administration would not
alter the purpose or object of the trust, nor vary the class of benefi-
ciaries, nor divert the fund from the charitable purposes named by
the donor. "To apply the doctrine of deviation to the case at bar,"
said the court,
would alter the testatrix' intention to benefit an organization in Marion,
Ohio to one of a general charitable intent to benefit the entire Ohio
order of such association and would, moreover, vary the class of bene-
ficiaries to an extent not contemplated by her, thus resulting in a di-
version of the fund from the limited charitable purpose named by her.7
In Kingdom v. Saxbe the court found that the testator had a gen-
eral charitable purpose to educate young people by a combination of
college courses and religious training, and had a particular charitable
purpose to accomplish this by means of a poly-technic industrial
school. However, it was impossible to carry out the precise method
set forth by the testator. Therefore, the court held that the doctrine
of deviation should be applied and a change made from the operation
of a school to the operation of a scholarship foundation in order to
accomplish the testator's general charitable purpose.
EVIDENCE REQUIRED
Thomas v. Thomas' and Richmond v. Hallock ° held that an oral,
express trust of land must be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The same degree of proof was required by the court in
Eckenroth v. Stone,' with respect to the impressing of a constructive
trust upon realty.
ROBERT C. BENSING
6. Id. at 245.
7. Id. at 246.
8. 161 N.E.2d 461 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
9. 108 Ohio App. 193, 161 N.E.2d 416 (1958). See also discussion in Real Property sec-
tion, p. 414 supra.
10. 158 NE.2d 914 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
11. 158 NXE.2d 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
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